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Abstract—Microgrids are adopted to provide distributed gen-
eration of renewable energy resources and scalable integration of
loads. To ensure the reliability of their power system operations,
distributed and cooperative control schemes are proposed by
integrating communication networks at their control layers.
However, the information exchanged at the communication
channels is vulnerable to malicious attacks aiming to introduce
voltage instability and blackouts. In this paper, we design and
evaluate a novel type of attacks on the cooperative control and
communication layers in microgrids, where the attacker targets
the communication links between distributed generators (DGs)
and manipulates the reference voltage data exchanged by their
controllers. We analyze the control-theoretic and detectability
properties of this attack to assess its impact on reference voltage
synchronization at the different control layers of a microgrid.
Results from numerical simulation are presented to demonstrate
this attack, and the maximum voltage deviation and inaccurate
reference voltage synchronization it causes in the microgrid.
I. INTRODUCTION
Modern electric power distribution networks integrate vari-
ous distributed generators (DGs), including photovoltaic (PV)
and wind power generation systems to address environmental
concerns [9]. DGs are designed to support renewable en-
ergy resources by interfacing them through voltage source
inverters (VSI), which provide the required control inputs. To
successfully coordinate DGs, autonomous subsystems called
microgrids are introduced to the power networks. A microgrid
is a small-scale low-voltage electrical network, consisting of
generation units, loads and storage elements, where dedicated
control systems enable them to provide guaranteed power qual-
ity for local loads and have a high integration of distributed
generation.
To guarantee safe and reliable operations of microgrids,
power networks need to be tightly coupled with supervi-
sory control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems. SCADA
systems collect data from remote sensors and send back
supervisory control commands to monitor and operate power
facilities. Communication networks play an increasingly im-
portant role in this process because more information need
to be collected and transmitted due to the rapidly growing of
penetration of distributed generation [3]. However, the widely
use of communication networks introduces new challenges
to the power infrastructure coupled with SCADA, as these
systems are vulnerable to malicious cyber attacks. A power
outage incident caused by the malware ”BlackEnergy” in
Ukraine during 2015 has proved that cyber attacks could cause
a major damage on power quality and devices. Thus, it is
important to study potential vulnerabilities of these systems
and design mitigation or prevention schemes against their
high-risk threats [12].
In [2] and [5], the authors propose cyber security modeling
frameworks including both power system and communication
networks. The analysis of cyber threats of centralized voltage
regulation in distribution grid and their respective detection
and mitigation schemes is explored in [3]. In particular,
stealthy attacks targeting transmitted data integrity of the
integrated Volt-VAR control system is studied in [11]. Further-
more, the capability of attackers to falsify the IEC 61850 data
flow controlling the inverters is studied in [4], which could
cause damage to the underlying physical system. However,
none of these works give a comprehensive analysis about the
consequences of cyber attacks on the power system.
Specifically, regarding cyber attacks on the
voltage/frequency control systems of microgrid systems,
in [12], the authors consider two types of attack scenario,
reference signal attack and measurement routing attack, and
study their impact on voltage stability and deviation in the
droop-controlled DGs. Risk assessment methods to quantify
the impact of measurement falsification attacks on a microgrid
system are studied in [6]. To the best of our knowledge, these
previous works only consider threat models targeting primary
control level of a microgrid system.
In this paper, we consider a more comprehensive con-
trol structure for a microgrid system, mainly a hierarchical
control approach consisting of three control levels: primary,
secondary and tertiary control [1]. Specifically, we design a
distributed cooperative hierarchical control system consisting
of droop control as primary control and cooperative control
as secondary control. We believe this control scheme is more
realistic and reliable than the control architecture considered
in [12] and [6], because of its better support for scalable
integration of local loads and high integration of distributed
generation.
Based on the above control model, we consider cyber
attacks that may target the communication links between
DGs, and we use risk assessment methods to quantitively
analyze the impact of these attacks on voltage deviation at the
primary control level and reference voltage synchronization at
the secondary control level. Our impact analysis results are
valuable for microgrid system designers to help them evaluate
potential cyber threats targeting these systems.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II,
we present the microgrid model with a hierarchical control
structure and we provide the basic settings for the power grid
and the communication network. In Section III, we design a
distributed cooperative control system and detail it details at
the primary and secondary control levels. In Section IV, we
detail the reference attack scenarios and perform its impact
analysis in terms of voltage deviation and reference synchro-
nization. In Section V, we present our simulations experiments
to validate the theoretical analysis of the attack impact. Finally,
we conclude the paper in Section VI.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
In this section, we describe the model of a microgrid system
in terms of its hierarchical control structure and communica-
tion network.
A. Microgrid System with Hierarchical Control Structure
Microgrids are designed to work in both gird-connected and
islanded operating modes, depending on whether connecting or
not to the main grid. The task of the microgrid control system
is to regulate voltage and frequency for different operating
modes, to achieve proper load sharing among DGs, to control
the power flow between the main grid and the microgrid, and
to optimize the cost of its operations.
Currently, a hierarchical control structure is designed to
achieve the above operating goals [1]. As shown in Figure 1,
the hierarchical control structure consists of primary, sec-
ondary and tertiary control levels. Each control level has its
own control goals because of operating in different timescales.
The primary control operates on a fast timescale, and is
responsible for the control of transients to stabilize the voltage
and frequency of the microgrid during changing of load or
generation, or subsequent to an islanding event. Secondary
control is designed to compensate for voltage and frequency
deviations caused by primary control in terms of fault con-
ditions. Finally, tertiary control, as the highest and slowest
control level, optimizes the operations in both operating modes





















Fig. 1. The hierarchical control structure of a microgrid consisting of primary,
secondary and tertiary control levels as specified in [1].
In this paper, we mainly consider the primary and secondary
control levels of microgrid with balanced loads. The primary
control is locally implemented at each DG, e.g., droop control
for inverter-based distributed energy resources (DER). How-
ever, the secondary control usually relies on a centralized con-
trol structure. Central controllers are designed to issue global
commands requiring information gathered from the whole
system and thus a complex two-way communication network
is also needed. This kind of communication network makes it
vulnerable and may effect the system reliability. In [1], the
authors replace the existing standard centralized secondary
control with an efficient distributed control structure. They
consider the microgrid as a multi-agent system where each
DG is an agent. A voltage source inverter (VSI) is employed
to connect a DG to the microgrid. The VSIs are interconnected
through the physical power network configuration.
A sparse communication network, which overlays the phys-
ical power network, is integrated in the control system. The
controllers use this communication network to only com-
municate in a distributed way with neighboring nodes. The
secondary controller also uses cooperative multi-agent control
techniques to make all agents act as a one group to a common
synchronization goal and follow cooperative decisions.
In this paper, we consider a distributed cooperative control
structure similar to [1]. The microgrid with N DG units is
depicted in Figure 2. Each DG unit is represented by a bus. The
lumped DERs and loads within one DG unit are respectively
modeled as a single DER and load. We set the DG unit directly
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Fig. 2. A microgrid control system with primary and secondary controllers.
Sparse communication networks are employed for data exchange between
neighboring DG units, e.g., transmitting reference signals and measurements
(denoted by the superscript s).
In this work, we assume that the three-phase power network
under study is balanced, which means it can be represented as
an equivalent single-phase system. Moreover, all N buses are
inverter buses and the corresponding voltage magnitude and
voltage angle of the i-th bus are respectively represented as
Vi and θi for i = 1, . . . , N .
Hence we define the active and reactive power injec-






ViVj(Gij cos(θij) +Bij sin(θij)),





where Gij = Rij/(R2ij +X
2
ij) ≥ 0 and Bij = −Xij/(R2ij +
X2ij) ≤ 0 are the conductance and susceptance of the transmis-
sion line between bus i and bus j, respectively. Additionally,
Gi = Gii +
∑
j∈Ni Gij ≥ 0 and Bi = Bii +
∑
j∈Ni Bij ≤ 0
are the self-conductance and self-susceptance, respectively
[12]. Note θij = θi − θj represents the angle difference
between node i and j. We also assume that the phase-angle
difference θij between any neighboring nodes for (i, j) ∈ V
to be constant.
B. Communication Network
In the microgrid system, DG units are considered as the
nodes of the communication graph and the corresponding
communication links represent its edges. Figure 2 describes
a line network, however a generic network topology of a
microgrid system is usually characterized by a directed graph
(digraph) G = (V, E , AG) with a nonempty finite set of N
nodes V = {v1, v2, . . . , vN}, a set of edges E ⊆ V × V , and
the associated adjacency matrix AG. The set Ni = {j ∈ V :
(i, j) ∈ E} denotes the neighbor set of node i. The weight is
represented by aij for the edge from node j to node i, and
aij = 0 if there is no data transfer from node j to node i.
Considering N nodes on the graph, the adjacency matrix is
defined as AG = [aij ] ∈ RN×N .
We define the diagonal in-degree matrix D = diag {di} ∈
RN×N , where di is the sum of communication weights from




The Laplacian matrix of the graph is defined as L = D −
AG. One property of the Laplacian matrix L is that the row
sums of L are all zero, because the row sums of D and AG
are equal.
A directed path from node i to node j is a sequence of
edges depicted as {(vi, vk), (vk, vl), . . . , (vm, vj)}. A graph is
considered to have a spanning tree if there exists a root node
with a directed path from that node to every other node in this
graph. A graph is strongly connected if there exists a directed
path between every two nodes, i.e., there exists a spanning
tree where every node is a root node [1] [7].
III. DISTRIBUTED COOPERATIVE CONTROL SYSTEM
In this section, we rely on existing control models to
propose a distributed cooperative control scheme for voltage
dynamics. We give a detailed description of both the primary
and secondary control of the microgrid system under study.
A. Primary Control
Figure 2 illustrates how the reference signals and measure-
ments are available to each controller. Making use of the
capabilities of inverter-based DERs, each DG unit is controlled
by a droop controller. The droop controller receives reference
signal through synchronization process between neighboring
nodes and voltage measurements from local meters. Let V ∗
be the reference voltage sent from the secondary controller
and Vj and θj , be the voltage magnitude and voltage angle of
the j-th bus, respectively.
The voltage dynamics of each DG unit is modeled as a
single integrator [12], and we choose the voltage quadratic
droop controller developed in [10] to compute the voltage
control output signals. The primary droop control law is
described as:
τiV̇i(t) = −κiV ci (t)(V ci (t)− V c∗i (t))−Qci (t), (2)
where τi > 0 is the inverter’s time-constant, κi > 0 is
the control gain of the droop controller, V ci (t) and Q
c
i (t)
respectively represent the received voltage measurement and
reactive power injection measurement with respect to bus i,
and V c∗i (t) is the received voltage reference signal deter-
mined by the secondary controller. For nominal operations,
these signals match the corresponding physical variables and
reference signals, i.e., V ci (t) = Vi(t), Q
c
i (t) = Qi(t), and
V c∗i (t) = V
∗
i (t). Nominally, the closed-loop dynamics of the
i-th DG unit are given by the differential equations
τiV̇i = −κiVi(Vi − V ∗i )−Qi
= −Vi(κiVi − κiV ∗i +
∑
j∈V
lij(θ)Vj),∀i = 1, . . . , N,
(3)
with the time argument omitted.
Assume the studied transmission line impedances have the
same ratio Rij/Xij = −Gij/Bij = ρ ≥ 0 for all lines
(i, j) ∈ E , where Rij and Xij are respectively the resistance
and reactance of bus i and bus j. Under this assumption, the
parameter lij(θ) is written as:
lij(θ) =
{
Bij(ρ sin(θij) + cos(θij)), i 6= j
−Bi, i = j.
(4)
Denote V = [V1 . . . VN ]
>, τ = [τ1 . . . τN ]
>, κ =
[κ1 . . . κN ]
>, and [V ] = diag {V } as the diagonal matrix
with Vi as the i-th diagonal entry, and similarly we have
[τ ] = diag {τ}, [κ] = diag {κ}. We can obtain the voltage
dynamics under the quadratic droop control in a vector form:
[τ ]V̇ = [V ]([κ]V ∗i − ([κ] + L(θ))V ), (5)
where the matrix L(θ) is defined as [L(θ)]ij = lij(θ).
Linearization of the voltage dynamics. For convenience
of theoretic analysis, we consider the Jacobian linearization
of the power system (5) around an equilibrium point (V̄ , V̄ c∗)
such that −([κ]+L(θ))V̄ +[κ]V̄ ∗ = 0. Denote x(t) = V (t)−
V and u(t) = V c∗(t) − V̄ c∗ as the voltage and reference
deviations, respectively. The corresponding linearized system
is described by
ẋ(t) = Ax(t) +Bu(t), (6)
where A = −[V̄ ][τ ]−1([κ] + L(θ)) and B = [V̄ ][τ ]−1[κ]. For
the sake of simplicity, we suppose that V̄ = 1pu subsequently,
where 1 represents a vector with all entries equal to 1.
B. Secondary Control
In this work, the goal of the secondary controller is to
generate the voltage reference signal for the primary controller
at each DG unit. We employ the distributed cooperative control
of multi-agent systems [1] to design the secondary voltage
controller for our microgrid system.
DGs are assumed to be able to communicate with each other
through the communication network G. We assume that only
one leader DG node i has access to the reference V ∗ by a
weight factor called the pinning gain gi. The pinning matrix
G is defined to carry all the pinning gains of the graph G =
diag {gi} ∈ RN×N . The computation of the global reference
voltage V ∗ is based on the load deferences between loads in
this microgrid and its neighbors, as specified in [7].
The synchronization of reference values of DGs in a com-
munication network G can be modeled as a tracking problem
in cooperative control. The consensus all DG nodes need to
reach is determined by the leader node.
Note that V ∗i is the voltage reference set point for DG i,
and denote Vref = [V ∗1 . . . V
∗
N ]
>. The DGs synchronize their
references to hold
V̇ref = −(L+G)(Vref − 1 · V ∗) (7)
at the steady state. Note that all eigenvalues of L + G have
positive real values, so equation (7) leads to the desired
tracking performance at the steady state. For each DG unit






j − V ∗i ) + gi(V ∗ − V ∗i ) (8)
IV. CYBER ATTACKS ON VOLTAGE CONTROL AND IMPACT
ANALYSIS
In this section we consider the model of the microgrid
system described in section II and we study the possible
adversary actions on the reference signal transmitted by the
communication network at the primary and secondary control
levels.
It is natural to consider a naive attack where an attacker sim-
ply falsifies the reference voltage value V ∗i for DG i. However,
it is easy to be detected by simple detection algorithms [3]
considering the admissible range
V ∗min ≤ V ∗i ≤ V ∗max, (9)
where V ∗min and V
∗
max are respectively the lower and upper
limit for the reference value.
In this work, we identify a novel type of of attack scenarios:
”measurement as reference ” attack. Under the assumption
that the attacker has knowledge about the hierarchical control
structure, it targets the communication link between DG
units and maliciously replaces the reference signal with the
measurement of the previous node. Since the two signals
have very close values and follow the same dynamic changes,
this attack is ”naturally stealthy”, and is possible to cause a
serious impact without being detected by traditional intrusion
detection algorithms.
First we describe the considered attack scenario and we give
its mathematical definition. Then we describe how the attack
influences the voltage control systems. We characterize the
attack impact by the maximum voltage magnitude deviation
and inaccurate reference voltage synchronization it causes.
A. measurement as reference attack
Without loss of generality, we assume the attacker replaces
the reference signal V ∗i+1 for node i + 1 with the voltage
measurement V si of node i when defining the attack.
The goal of measurement as reference attack is set to cause
voltage fluctuations and irregular regulations to harm the loads
without violating the admissible range (9). For convenience
of analysis, we assume only one communication link is under
attack. The definition of measurement as reference attack is
given as follows.
Definition 1 (measurement as reference attack): In a mea-
surement as reference attack on the communication link be-
tween DG unit i and i + 1, the attacker manipulates the
exchanged data by replacing the reference signal V ∗i+1(t) for
DG unit i+1 with the voltage measurement V si (t) of DG unit
i , so that
V ∗i+1(t) = V
s
i (t), (10)
Furthermore, the droop control signal at DG unit i+ 1 under
attack is given by
τiV̇i+1(t) = −κi+1V ci+1(t)(V ci+1(t)− V si (t))−Qci+1(t)
(11)
B. Attack Impact on Voltage Deviation
One impact of the measurement as reference attack is
voltage magnitude deviations . Consider the resulting changes
to the voltage magnitude at DG j in the network, i.e., Vj . The
resulting linearized system under attack can be written as




u(t) = e>i x(t),
(12)
where A = −[τ ]−1(κ+L(θ)) and ei ∈ RN is the i-th column
of the N -dimensional identify matrix. The attack impact can
be quantified as the maximum deviation of yj(t) caused by a
corrupted input u(t) = e>i x(t), which is bounded by |u(t)| ≤
δ, where V ∗min ≤ δ ≤ V ∗max.
Computation of maximum voltage deviation. We use
sup
t≥0
|yj(t)| to represent the maximum voltage magnitude of
DG j under a measurement as reference attack (10) on the
link between DG i and i + 1. We know that the linearized
system (12) under attack is a positive system [8] since A
is a Metzler matrix with non-negative off-diagonal entries
and τ−1i+1κi+1ei+1, e
>
j are non-negative [12]. Let’s define the
transfer function of the system (12) as H(s) = Y (s)/U(s) =




j (sI −A)−1ei+1. (13)
According to the properties of positive systems [8], we know






which characterizes the maximum amplitude of the output




|u(t)| ≤ δ. (15)
So we can compute
sup
t≥0
|yj(t)| = ‖H‖L∞−ind · ‖u‖L∞








where [−A−1]j,i+1 is the element of row j column i + 1
from matrix −A−1. So τ−1i+1κi+1δ[−A−1]j,i+1 gives the upper
bound of the voltage deviation caused by the attack. Since the
δ value in (15) is determined by the system state, the the upper
bound in (16) is tight because the maximum is reachable.
Therefore, we find that the impact on voltage deviation of each
node depends on the structure of matrix A, which reflects the
power system topology.
C. Impact on Reference Voltage Synchronization
Besides the voltage deviation, the attack also affects the
reference synchronization regarding the secondary control
level. Note that the reference of each DG unit will follow
the differential equation (7) under nominal operations. So the
problem of studying what is the attack impact on reference
synchronization is mapped to seeking for the initial conditions
of differential equation (7) caused by the attack.
Since the primary control is operating much faster than
the secondary control, the voltage state of each DG node
would become stable again very quickly and reaches a new
equilibrium point when the secondary controller regulates
the reference signals. To compute this equilibrium point,
we let V̇ = 0 in (5), i.e., [κ]V ∗i − ([κ] + L(θ))V = 0.
According to the definition of measurement as reference attack
V ∗i+1(t) = V
s
i (t), we have
V ∗i+1 = Vi = e
>
i ([κ] + L(θ))
−1
[κ]Vref . (17)
So we can get the initial conditions of differential equation (7)
under attack as
(e>i ([κ] + L(θ))
−1
[κ]− e>i+1)Vref = 0. (18)
The differential equation (17) with initial condition (18)
describes the reference signal synchronization process under
attack for each node. When the secondary controller regulates
the set point V ∗, all references of the nodes relying on
communication with node i + 1 for synchronization, are not
able to reach the consensus V ∗.
V. SIMULATION
In this section, we use simulation tools to validate the
theoretical analysis of the measurement as reference attack
and its impact proposed in the previous section.
A. Simulation Settings
We use Matlab and Simulink tools to build the microgrid
control system described in Figure 2 and model the measure-
ment as reference attack provided in Definition 1.
For the power system simulation settings, we consider a
microgrid system with 4 DG units in Figure 2, i.e., N = 4. We
follow the model settings proposed in [12] and [6], where all
power lines, DERs and loads are identical. The power system
is characterized by (1) with parameters: ρ = 0.5, Bij = −0.2,
and Gij = −ρBij for all edges (i, j) ∈ E and Bij = −0.2
and Gii = −ρ |Bii| for all buses.
For the primary control, we set the parameters θ12 =
−0.01rad, θ23 = −0.045rad, and θ34 = −0.01rad, to make
sure that the phase-angle differences between any neighboring
nodes are constant. The quadratic droop control modeled
by (5) and (2) is characterized by parameters τi = 10−4,
τθi = 10
−2, and κi = 0.2 for all buses.
The voltage dynamics under primary control are defined
by the nonlinear differential equations (5). Through Jacobian
linearization, the corresponding linearized dynamics charac-
terized by (6) is given as
A = 10−4 ·

−4.01 1.88 0 0
2.1 −6.01 2.04 0
0 1.95 −6.01 1.88
0 0 2.1 −4.01
 .
Clearly the above system is positive and the properties of
positive systems [8] are applicable.
Finally, we choose typical parameters for the secondary
control. As depicted in Figure 2, the network is a 4-node
line topology and DG 1 is the only pinned root node. Con-
sidering the communication network topology and a proper
synchronization rate, we set the adjacency matrix AG = [aij ]
carrying the communication weights of a21 = 12, a32 = 11,
a41 = 10 and all other weights equal to zero, and the pinning
matrix G = diag {gi} carrying all pinning gains of g1 = 10,
g2 = g3 = g4 = 0.
B. Simulation Results
Considering the above simulation settings, the voltage of
each DG is in stable state and the global reference set point
V ∗ = 1pu. At time t = 2× 10−3s, the attacker introduces the
measurement as reference attack by replacing the reference
signal V ∗2 at node 2 with the voltage measurement V1 at node
1.
As shown in Figure 3, the attack cause voltage deviation at
each DG unit, which is a short-term impact on the primary
control. We can see the voltages reach a stable state again
very quickly. Comparing the voltage deviation of the simulated
non-linear system under attack with the linearization analysis
in Section IV, we can find that the voltage deviation caused by













Fig. 3. The impact of the measurement as reference attack on voltage
deviation.
the attack is within boundary computed in (16). Comparison
result shows that the voltage deviation of the simulated non-
linear system under attack is the same to the linearized system,
which shows our linearization analysis in Section IV is valid.












Fig. 4. The impact of the measurement as reference attack on reference
synchronization.
How the attack influences the reference synchronization
is shown in Figure 4. At time t = 0.1s, the secondary
controller regulates the reference set point from V ∗ = 1pu
to V ∗ = 1.05pu. After about 0.5s, the reference signals finish
the synchronization process. We find that DG 2 and DG 3 no
longer reach the consensus V ∗, which could lead to a heavy
impact on voltage regulation in a microgrid system.
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we develop and design measurement as
reference cyber-attack targeting both primary and secondary
control levels of a distributed cooperative control scheme for
a microgrid. We analyze the impact of this attack where
the goal of the attacker is to introduce a reference voltage
deviation by manipulating the synchronization data exchanged
between the distributed controllers. We use control-theoretic
tools to derive the maximum voltage deviation introduced by
this attack where the system will not synchronize to the correct
setting point provided by the secondary controller. Moreover,
the theoretical analysis results of the impact are validated by
simulation. As a future work, the impact of this attack on
frequency synchronization and attack detection algorithms will
be investigated.
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